We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. We discuss how such games can help us to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, we consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature.

📑 Lecture Chapters:

Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Definition [00:00:00]
Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Hawk vs. Dove [00:30:50]
Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Discussion [00:50:00]
Monomorphic and Polymorphic Populations Theory: Identification and Testability [00:55:39]

Source: Ben Polak, Game Theory (Yale University: Open Yale Courses). Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0.