Lecture 6 - Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.
📑 Lecture Chapters:
Coordination Games: Scope for Leadership and Strategic Complements [00:00:00]
Coordination Games: The Battle of the Sexes [00:04:59]
Cournot Duopoly: Math [00:18:37]
Cournot Duopoly: Real World Examples [00:53:28]
Source: Ben Polak, Game Theory (Yale University: Open Yale Courses). Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0.
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Watch what matters. Create what pays.
This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.
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Lecture 1 - Introduction: Five First Lessons1:08:32 Free
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Lecture 6 - Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot1:12:05 Free
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Lecture 9 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis1:12:52 Free