Lecture 24 - Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner's Curse
We discuss auctions. We first distinguish two extremes: common values and private values. We hold a common value auction in class and discover the winner's curse, the winner tends to overpay. We discuss why this occurs and how to avoid it: you should bid as if you knew that your bid would win; that is, as if you knew your initial estimate of the common value was the highest. This leads you to bid much below your initial estimate. Then we discuss four forms of auction: first-price sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid, open ascending, and open descending auctions. We discuss bidding strategies in each auction form for the case when values are private. Finally, we start to discuss which auction forms generate higher revenues for the seller, but a proper analysis of this will have to await the next course.
📑 Lecture Chapters:
Auctions: Common versus Private Values [00:00:00]
Auctions: Winner's Curse in the First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction [00:08:16]
Auctions: Other Types of Auction [00:42:38]
Auctions: Revenue Generation in Different Types of Auctions [00:58:35]
Source: Ben Polak, Game Theory (Yale University: Open Yale Courses). Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0.
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Watch what matters. Create what pays.
This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.
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Lecture 6 - Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot1:12:05 Free
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Lecture 9 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis1:12:52 Free